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COMMENTS
THE DRINKING DRIVER:
AN APPROACH TO SOLVING A PROBLEM
OF UNDERESTIMATED SEVERITY
The high incidence of automobile accidents in the United States has
made driving an automobile a very dangerous activity. Even when drivers
are functioning at maximum efficiency, accidents are inevitable. It seems
ridiculous, then, that so many drivers continue to operate an automobile
when their driving efficiency is significantly lowered by the consumption
of alcohol. It would seem obvious that American laws should operate
swiftly and effectively to eliminate the presence of such drivers from
American highways. However, American laws have not succeeded in preventing such activity to a satisfactory extent. These unfortunate facts
provide the reasons for this Comment: first, to show on the basis of statistical studies the severity of the drinking-driver problem in the United
States; second, to examine American laws and point out their basic weaknesses; third, to discuss the factors behind these laws which have
deterred their effectiveness; and finally, to suggest means by which the
problem may be alleviated.
I.

THE SEVERITY OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of the drinking driver and the difficulties encountered by
the law in treating it were pointed out as early as 1927.1 However, until
recently, the severity of the problem has been largely underestimated. In
1937 the National Safety Council estimated that the percentage of drinking
drivers involved in accidents was only 7 percent. 2 Many articles written
during the 1940's set the percentage of accidents involving drinking drivers
at approximately 15 percent. 3 While this figure may appear fairly high
relative to that of the National Safety Council, it is hardly shocking. Even
as late as 1957, New York's official state publications attributed only one
to two percent of that State's fatal accidents to the drinking driver. 4 The
conservative nature of these figures, however, was greatly offset by much
1. 71 SOL. J.954 (1927).
2. Rabinowitch, Medicolegal Aspects of Chemical Tests for Intoxication, 39 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 225, 226 (1948).
3. See, e.g., Monroe, The Drinking Driver: Problems of Enforcement, 8 Q.J.
STUD. ON ALCOHOL 385 (1947) ; Comment, Commonwealth Versus the Drinking Driver,
10 U. PITT. L. REv. 164, 166 (1948).
4. Roalman, Drinking and Driving: New Approaches, TODAY'S HSALTH, March,
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higher estimates derived from medical studies and police records. 5 In
addition, many writers pointed out the widely varying and generally unreliable means utilized to measure the effect of the drinking driver's presence on the road.6
Although there is still no accurate statistical method with which to
measure precisely the danger that the drinking driver presents, two general
types of studies now yield rather accurate data: (1) studies of drivers involved in accidents in a particular random sample, from which the percentage of drivers who have been drinking is ascertained; and (2) studies
which test the impairment in perception and other driving skills caused by
various alcohol levels in their subjects. The results of the latter studies
are supplemented in this Comment by a discussion of the amount of alcoholic consumption needed to attain certain alcohol levels.
The earliest study of the first type was that of Heise, which was
conducted by analyzing 119 consecutive accidents in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, in the early 19 3 0's. 7 Dr. Heise's results, especially when compared
to the conservative estimates noted above, were rather startling: 74 of
the 119 accidents were caused by a driver having a greater than .02 percent
alcohol level. 8 Perhaps the most publicized study of this type was conducted
by Haddon and Bradess in Westchester County, New York, the sample
for which was the 626 motor vehicle fatalities occurring in that county
between 1950 and 1958.9 The results here were equally conclusive: 160
of the 208 drivers who were fatally injured were found to have "measurable" alcohol levels.' 0 A study of the 500 fatal accidents occurring in
Baltimore between 1951 and 1956 showed that 95 of the 156 drivers who
were fatally injured had an alcohol level in excess of .01 percent." Drinking
drivers were involved in 50 percent of the fatal motor vehicle accidents in
Texas in 1952,2 and a Cleveland survey of the early 1950's showed that
more than 50 percent of the highway accidents in that city involved a
driver who had been consuming alcohol. 13 The 50 percent figure was con5. Figures on New York City accidents for 1957 showed, for example, that 38
of the 69 drivers killed had an alcohol level of greater than .10 percent. Am. CITY,
May, 1958, at 141. See also Roalman, supra note 4, at 34, 35.
6. See, e.g., Rabinowitch, supra note 2, at 226. A 1945 article discussing chemical
tests for intoxication, though recognizing that a high percentage of accidents involved
drinking drivers, candidly admitted that no accurate statistics were available. Comment,
Constitutionality of Compulsory Chemical Tests to Determine Alcoholic Intoxication,
40 ILL. L. Riv. 245, 246 (1945).
7. Heise, Alcohol and Automobile Accidents, 103 J.A.M.A. 739 (1934).
8. Id. at 739. A .02 percent alcohol level is attained by many persons after
consuming only the proverbial "two beers." For an explanation of the amounts of
alcohol which must be consumed in order to attain certain levels of alcohol in the
system see p. 101 infra.
9. Haddon & Bradess, Alcohol in the Single Vehicle Fatal Accident, 169
J.A.M.A. 1587 (1959). Haddon was the director of the New York State Driver
Research Center from 1957 to 1961 and allegedly began his research after policemen
scoffed at the New York figures such as those cited at p. 97 supra. Roalman, supra
note 4, at 34.
10. Haddon & Bradess, supra note 9, at 1588.
11. Freimuth, Watts, & Fisher, Alcohol and Highway Fatalities,Symposium on
Traffic Accidents, 3 J. FOR. Sci. 65, 66 (1958).
12. 6 BAYLOR L. Rnv. 404, 405 (1954).
13. Seliger, Alcohol at the Wheel, 44 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 402 (1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss1/6
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firmed by similar highway fatality studies in 1960 in Montana and in
14
Buffalo, New York.
Perhaps the most painstaking study in the area was made by Holcomb
in Evanston, Illinois, in the late 1930's. 15 After finding that 46 percent of
drivers involved in the 270 injury-producing accidents in the Evanston area
over a 3-year period had been drinking, he enlisted college students to spot
check all drivers at certain strategic points in Evanston to determine what
percentage of the total number of drivers on the road were drinking. 16 The
findings, after 1,750 spot checks, were that only 12 percent of the general
driving population had been drinking. Thus, he concluded that drinking
drivers involved in injury-producing accidents were overrepresented by
almost four times their presence in the general driving population.' 7 The
study also discussed - and rejected - the argument that the presence
of a relatively greater number of drinking drivers on the roads at night,
when fatigue is most apparent and when darkness is liable to impair driving ability, is a significant factor in the high percentage of drinking drivers
8
among people involved in traffic accidents.'
The Holcomb study is particularly significant because it made an
unusual and diligent attempt to eliminate the confounding variables which
can affect any statistical analysis. However, several variables may still exist
which make the results of many studies of the first type deceptively low
in establishing the number of accidents caused by drinking drivers. For
example, it is impossible to measure the number of accidents caused by
the drinking driver who forces a nondrinking driver off the road or into
another vehicle due to his erratic driving. In light of the fact that a
drinking driver probably encounters about 5,000 other drivers on even a
short trip,19 it is likely that the number is significantly high. Another
example is illustrated by a Cleveland study which differentiated traffic
deaths caused by injuries in accidents themselves from deaths occurring on
the highway from causes unrelated to the accident itself, such as heart
attacks. 20 It was found that 92 percent of those dying from nonaccidental
causes had a negative alcohol level, while only 36 percent of those dying
from accidental causes had a negative level. 21 This finding seems to indicate that many studies of the first type include victims of nonaccidental
causes in their samples, thereby mistakenly reducing the percentage of
traffic deaths attributable to the drinking driver.
Heise was also the pioneer of the second type of study, which measures
the impairment of perception and other driving skills caused by various
levels of alcohol consumed by subjects. 22 Subjects given 30 cc. of whiskey,
14. Heise, The Driver Had Been Drinking, ScI. DIG., April, 1962, at 57.
15. Holcomb, Alcohol in Relation to Traffic Accidents, 111 J.A.M.A. 1076 (1938).
16. Id. at 1077-78.
17. Id. at 1078.
18. Id. at 1082-83.
19. Seliger, supra note 13, at 404.
20. Gerber, Joliet, & Feegel, Single Motor Vehicle Accidents in Cuyahoga County
(Ohio): 1958-1963, 11 J. FOR. SCL 144 (1966).
21. Id. at 147-48.
22. Heise, supra note 7.
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which was found to induce an average alcohol level of .02 percent, were
shown to have a measurable loss in efficiency in typewriting tests. 28 Next,
subjects were given 150 cc. of whiskey, which produced levels somewhat
short of .10 percent, and were asked to perform actual driving tests. It
24
was found that all subjects had trouble avoiding obstacles and backing.
The classical study in this area was made by Bjerver and Goldberg
in 1950.25 In this study, several expert drivers performed steering, parking,

and turning tests. After completing the tests, some of the drivers consumed
40 to 53 cc. of alcohol, yielding an average alcohol level of about .05
percent. Then, all of the drivers were asked to complete the test a second
time. 26 The results of time tests, relative to the driver's initial performance, showed an improvement of 20 percent in a control group of drivers
who had not consumed alcohol but a deterioration of almost 30 percent
in the group which had consumed alcohol.2 7 A "flicker" test, which
measures the eye's ability to distinguish flickering light, and a "blink" test,
which measures the stimulus required to produce a blink, were subsequently
administered on the same subjects, employing the same procedures as in
the driving tests. While the control group showed no change in performance, the group which had consumed alcohol experienced an average deterioration of 32.4 percent in the flicker test and 35 percent in the blink test.2 8
A similar, more recent study utilized a model car apparatus to test its
10 subjects.2 9 The subjects showed some impairment of performance relative to the control group at the .05 percent alcohol level, 85 percent efficiency
at the .10 percent level, and only 70 percent efficiency at the .15 percent
level.8 0 Studies testing performances in "roadeo" or driving-hazard courses
in Missouri and Kansas found that subjects were noticeably impaired at
an alcohol level of .08 percent, and similar tests in Ontario indicated an
impairment to most subjects at the .03 percent level.31 An interesting
British experiment found that three experienced Manchester bus drivers,
after consuming two ounces of alcohol, tried to drive their buses through
82
an opening 14 inches narrower than their buses.
In light of these studies, figures indicating that the drinking driver's
relative probability of causing an accident is 45 times greater than that of
a driver who has not been drinking if his blood alcohol level is .18 percent,
35 times greater if his level is .16 percent, 20 times greater if his level is .14
percent, and 10 times greater if his level is .10 percent, seem well-founded. 3
23. Id. at 739-40.
24. Id.
25. Bjerver & Goldberg, Effect of Alcohol Ingestion on Driving Ability, 11 Q.J.
STUD. ON ALCOHOL 1 (1950).
26. Id. at 2-7.
27. Id. at 9-14.
28. Id. at 24, 25.
29. Loomis & West, The Influence of Alcohol on Automobile Driving Ability,
19 Q.J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 30 (1958).
30. Id. at 37, 44.
31. Ryan, Use of Chemical Tests to Prove Impairment by Alcohol, 2 CRIM. L.Q.
41, 53 (1959).
32. The results of this experiment are reported in 74 ScI. Nxws LMrIrR 15 (1958).
33. American Ins. Ass'n, Drinking Driving Drugs, Release EG-110 (1966). See
also Holcomb, supra note 15, at 1081, for similar figures.
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To give some idea of how many drinks one must consume to reach
a certain measure of alcoholic consumption, and the corresponding alcohol
levels such consumption produces, the following guidelines are suggested.
Keeping in mind that the alcoholic content of a beverage is one-half of the
proof level, a person consumes one ounce of alcohol by drinking two ounces
of a 100-proof liquor or one 12-ounce bottle of beer.8 4 The consumption of two ounces of alcohol raises one's alcohol level to .04 percent, four
ounces raises it to .09 percent, and eight ounces raises it to .14 percent.3 5
Although these figures vary somewhat according to the individual's weight
and the amount of food he has consumed, 86 by consuming four ounces of
100-proof liquor, one has probably reached an alcohol level of .04 percent,
at which level all of the studies noted indicate that his driving ability
will be impaired.
The foregoing studies do not directly indicate how great the menace
of the drinking driver is, especially with respect to the individual who
consumes a relatively small amount of an alcoholic beverage. However,
the results of tests under both types of studies make it apparent that the
drinking driver is involved in a very high percentage of accidents, that
driving abilities are impaired at a rather low alcohol level, and that such
abilities deteriorate at an accelerating pace as the level increases. Such
conclusions are rather convincing evidence that drinking drivers are a
highly dangerous group.
II.

THE CURRENT AMERICAN LAW

The potential effectiveness of the law as a deterrent to the drinking
driver seems obvious, since, except in the case of the alcoholic, 7 drinking
and driving are both willful acts. All States have some legislative enactment prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles when one's ability to do so
is impaired by alcohol. The statutes vary in their specificity in establishing
what constitutes impairment and what penalties shall be imposed if it is
established that one is impaired. The present Pennsylvania statute is set out
below as representative of the law as it exists in many states :38
It shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle ...
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ....
Penalty. - Any person violating the provisions of this section,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction there34. Roalman, supra note 4, at 74.
35. Id. at 75.
36. Id.
37. See pp. 109-11 infra.
38. On August 1, 1968, Governor Shafer signed a bill amending the Pennsylvania
statute in effect when this Comment was written, to be effective September 29, 1968.
Philadelphia Inquirer, August 2, 1968, at 5, col. 3. The amendments did not alter the
penalty provisions, but they did make the statute's general provisions considerably
more detailed. The important substantive changes were the addition of an "implied
consent" provision (see pp. 104-06 infra for a discussion of such provisions) and the
establishment of the alcohol level at which one is presumed to be intoxicated at .10
percent (see pp. 106-07 infra for a discussion of alcohol levels). PURON'S PA.
LEGISLATIV9 SXRV., Act No. 237 (July 31, 1968).
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of . . . be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than one hundred dollars
($100.00) and not more than five hundred dollars ($500.00) and
costs of prosecution, or undergo imprisonment for not more than three
(3) years, or suffer both such fine and imprisonment.3 9
The statute, with the exception of the penalty provisions, could hardly
be more general. It makes no mention of how law enforcement agencies
are to determine whether a suspect is "under the influence" to the extent
that he violates the statute. It is apparent that some objective standard
must be established to settle this uncertainty, if not by statute, then by
the practice of the police and the courts. Hence, Pennsylvania and all
other states have utilized chemical tests to determine the alcohol level in
the breath, blood, urine, or saliva of a party accused of driving while intoxicated, from which it may be inferred that he is impaired in his driving
ability. Although what is measured - level of alcohol - and what is
sought to be prevented - impaired driving ability - are not identical, the
chemical tests are, nevertheless, an attempt to add objectivity and certainty,
necessary elements of any successful law, to an otherwise hopelessly subjective problem.
Chemical tests for intoxication have been known since Civil War
times, 40 but were not used systematically until the work of Widmark in
Sweden in 1914.41 The most commonly used tests are the blood test,
42
preferred for its accuracy, and the breath test, preferred for its simplicity.
Although chemical tests were once largely limited to use as corroborative evidence of intoxication, 43 the tests are now everywhere admissible
into evidence as direct proof. 44 The tests are presently recognized as
quite accurate by the medical profession. 4 5 Even an article suggesting defenses to attorneys of drinking-driver defendants concedes that the
accuracy of the tests is not open to serious question. 40 Experiments measuring the accuracy of the various testing devices have shown that "breathalyzers," usually considered the least accurate of the devices, are off less
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1037 (1960).

40. Monroe, supra note 3, at 394.
41. Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and Legal Problems
of Chemical Testing, 44 MINN. L. Rgv. 673, 675 (1960).

42. See Watts, Some Observations on Police-Administered Tests for Intoxication,
45 N.C.L. Rvv. 34, 49-76 (1966). This article describes all the tests in some detail.

43. See Void, Laboratory Tests for Alcoholism in Motor Vehicle Prosecutions,
17 NEB. L. BULL. 251, 259-62 (1938). Chemical tests were thought to be insufficiently
reliable to use in the trial stages in Pennsylvania as late as 1956. 29 TEMP. L.Q. 210,
214 (1956).
44. See, e.g., Note, Chemical Tests for Intoxication: A Legal, Medical, and
Constitutional Survey, 37 N.D.L. Rlv. 212, 214 (1961).
45. Fisher, Yes, Should There Be a Statute Authorizing Chemical Tests for
Determining Intoxication of Drivers?, MrCH. ST. B.J., April, 1960, at 20, 24. In the
late 1940's the accuracy of the tests was strongly questioned by one medical man,
Rabinowitch, supra note 2. This attack was immediately rebutted by other members of
the medical profossion. Harger, Medicolegal Aspects of Chemical Tests for Alcoholic
Intoxication, 39 J. CRiu. L.C. & P.S. 402 (1948) ; Muehlberger, Medicolegal Aspects
of Chemical Tests for Alcoholic Intoxication, 39 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 411 (1948).
See also Comment, Admissibility and Constitutionality of Chemical Intoxication Tests,
35 TEXAs L. REv. 813, 815-16 (1957).
46. Hollopeter, The Trial of a "Drunk-Driving" Case, 8 TIAx LAwYERs' GumE

407, 411 (1964).
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than .01 percent in their reading almost 70 percent of the time. 47 Moreover, an experiment comparing readings from different devices used on
48
the same subjects has shown the readings to be virtually identical.
Of primary importance is how the results of the chemical tests are
to be interpreted. The data received from the tests is translated into a
determination of the alcohol level of the subject, and a presumption of the
subject's impairment at a certain level determines whether he is to be
considered too intoxicated to legally drive. In 1939 a resolution of a joint
conference of the National Safety Council and the American Medical Association recommended that a level of less than .05 percent be presumed
safe, that no presumption be drawn at levels from .05 to .15 percent, and
that a level of greater than .15 percent be presumed to indicate that the
party tested is intoxicated. 49 Consequently, most states have adopted the
.15 percent level, either by statute or by judicial precedent, as a definite
criterion for determining whether a suspect is presumed to be intoxicated. 50
A few have set the decisive level at .10 percent, 51 and one state, Utah, has
reduced it to .08 percent.

52

The most important result of the use of the chemical tests is that it
effectuates a high increase in the percentage of drivers charged with
drunken driving who are ultimately convicted. For example, without the
tests, only 27 of the 83 persons charged with drunken driving in Boston
in 1964 were convicted. s Similarly, only 144 of the 237 so charged in
Baltimore in 1950 were convicted.5 4 Conversely, cities using the tests
were able to obtain very high conviction rates. Oakland, for example,
convicted 149 of the 153 parties charged with driving while intoxicated
in a single year.5 5 The increase in convictions by 222 percent in Detroit
in 1947 is another graphic illustration of what the adoption of chemical
tests in a city can accomplish. 50 An examination of conviction rates in
several counties in Pennsylvania in 1948 showed that counties using
chemical tests obtained very high conviction rates, while Allegheny County,
without tests, convicted only about 50 percent of parties charged with
57
drunken driving.
47. Smith & Lucas, Breath Tests for Alcohol, 1 CRIM. L.Q. 25, 39 (1958).
48. Brooks, Chemical Tests for "Driving Under the Influence," MAss. L.Q., Dec.,
1952, at 10, 23.
49. Campbell, Traffic Deaths Go Up Again, 22 JAG J. 61, 63 (1967).
50. See, e.g., Bongartz, It's Time to Stop Drunk Drivers from Killing, TRUE,
Sept., 1968, at 25, 89; Roalman, supra note 4, at 35.
51. Bongartz, supra note 50, at 89, cites Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky,
Minnesota, North Carolina, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia
as establishing the .10 percent level. Pennsylvania is now also included in this group.
See note 38 supra.
52. UTAH CODx ANN. § 41-6-44(3) (Supp. 1967). The propriety of the levels
established by the various states is discussed at pp. 106-07 infra.
53. Comment, Proposed Legislation - Chemical Testing in Massachusetts - The
Need for Implied Consent, 1 PORTiA L.J. 196, 197 (1966).
54. Fisher, Introductory Remarks, The Compulsory Use of Chemical Tests for
Alcoholic Intoxication - A Symposium, 14 MD. L. Rev. 111, 114 (1954).
55. Waller, Identification of Problem Drinking Among Drunken Drivers, 200
J.A.M.A. 114 (1967).

56. Leonard, Tests for Intoxication, 38 J. CilM. L.C. & P.S. 533, 536 (1948).
57. Comment, supra note 3, at 169.
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Moreover, studies of conviction rates in jurisdictions where the party
charged is permitted the right to refuse to take such tests show significant
differences in the conviction rate of those taking the tests and those refusing to take them. A study in Ottawa of parties arrested for drunken driving from 1960 to 1962 found that 73 percent of those refusing were
convicted, as compared to a 94 percent conviction rate for those who took
the test. 58 A study of parties arrested for drunken driving in Allentown,

Pennsylvania, in 1967 showed that only 60 percent of the "refusers" were
59
convicted, whereas 85.7 percent of those taking the test were convicted.
In addition to the chemical tests, other objective tests have been used
to some extent. Performance tests in which the party charged is requested
to perform certain motor or verbal skills,60 and movies taken by the police
of the accused's activities 6 ' are examples, although neither appears to be
in widespread use. Of course, the testimony of policemen and medical
or other observers regarding the accused's condition is always admissible
and can supplement any of the more objective forms of evidence.

III.

THE

CHANGES REQUIRED

To

IMPROVE THE CURRENT

AMERICAN LAW

Since many jurisdictions do not require a party charged with drunken
driving to undergo chemical tests if he refuses to do so, whether one is
convicted often depends to a great extent upon whether he is wise enough
to refuse. This points out a rather glaring loophole in the drinking driver
laws. It is not surprising to find that, as the police begin to use chemical
tests more widely and a greater number of drivers are apprehended, the
percentage of drivers refusing to take the test steadily increases.6 2 And,
often, the accused parties who have drunk the most are least likely to
submit to the test.63
The rapidly-spreading answer to this problem is the "implied consent"
statute. Such a statute is based upon the premise that obtaining a license
to drive an automobile is a "privilege," for which a driver must "impliedly
consent" to have his breath or blood tested for its alcoholic content when
a policeman has reasonable grounds to believe that he was driving while
58. Coldwell & Grant, Drinking Drivers in an Eastern Ontario City, 9 J. FOR.
Sci. 271, 276 (1964).
59. C. Scholl, The Drunken Driver, April 3, 1968, at 20 (unpublished paper
presented in a Seminar in Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania. A copy is
on file in the offices of the Villanova Law Review.)
60. See Monroe, supra note 3, at 403. Such tests are used in California. Knight,
We Jail Drunken Drivers, SAT. EVEN. PosT, April 26, 1958, at 31, 102.
61. See Seymour, Admissibility of Police Movies of Drunk Drivers, 1966 INS.
L.J. 754; Watts, supra note 42, at 47-48. It is reported that the use of such movies
has resulted in a 95 percent conviction rate in Denver. TIME, Nov. 22, 1963, at 61.
62. See Coldwell & Grant, supra note 58, at 276, where the increase of refusals
from the first year in which police administered breathalyzer tests in Ottawa to the
second year was from 7 percent to 17 percent. The Allentown study of C. Scholl,
supra note 59, at 20, showed that only 50 percent of drivers apprehended in that
Pennsylvania city consented to undergo chemical tests.
63. See Freeman, The Drinking Driver, BRIT. MED. J., Oct.-Dec., 1964, at 1634,
which reports this phenomenon in Great Britain.
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intoxicated. The driver can refuse to submit to the tests under such
statutes; but then his "privilege" of driving is taken away, usually for as
6 4
long a period as if the driver were actually convicted of drunken driving.
Hence, the problem of physically forcing a driver to undergo the tests
is avoided.
Although such statutes were proposed as early as 1945,65 it was not
until 1953 that New York adopted the first.0 6 Such a provision is included in the Uniform Vehicle Code67 and the adoption of such laws
has been almost uniformly endorsed by law review articles. s By 1963,
12 states had passed such laws, 69 and, by mid-1968, the count had increased to 28.70
The constitutionality of such statutes seems to have been put at rest,
at least for the time being, by the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Schmerber v. California.71 There, the entry into evidence of the results
of a blood test performed on the defendant against his will was held
proper.7 2 Schmerber does, however, raise two interesting questions. First,
it has been contended that Schmerber makes implied consent laws unnecessary, since the accused party can be forced to submit to the test. 7 ' In fact,
California, the State in which Schmerber was forced to take the test, had
no such law then and as yet has not enacted one. However, as mentioned
previously, many States do not require the accused to submit to tests
against his will. Even within a single State, the possibility exists that
some municipalities will enforce the use of the tests, while others are more
lenient.7 4 Again, much depends upon whether the accused is wise enough
64. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39: 4-50(b) (Supp. 1967) (fine of $50 to $100
and loss of driving privileges for 6 months if convicted of drinking-driving) and
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39: 4-50.4 (Supp. 1967) (loss of driving privileges for 6 months
ifrefused to take test).
65. Comment, supra note 6, at 262.
66. N.Y. Vva. & TRA'. LAWS § 71-a (McKinney 1954).
67. UNInORM V.HICL4 COD9 § 6-205.
68. See, e.g., Symposium, Implied Consent for Intoxication Tests, 18 Wyo. L.J.
252, 257-58 (1964) ; Comment, ConstitutionalLaw - Validity of New York Statute
Setting Out Motorists' Implied Consent to Chemical Tests for Intoxication, 51 MicH.
L. Rev. 1195, 1202 (1953). But see Comment, Implied Consent to a Chemical Test
for Intoxication: Doubts About Section 6-205 of the Uniform Vehicle Code, 31 U.
CmI. L. Rev. 603, 611 (1964) ; Comment, Constitutionality in Wisconsin of Compulsory Scientific Tests for Intoxication, 1953 Wis. L. Rev. 351, 367-70.
69. La Plante, Alcohol Testing: Connecticut's Implied Consent Statute, 38 CONN.
B.J. 16, 17 (1964).
70. Bongartz, supra note 50, at 91. Pennsylvania is now added to this list.
See note 38 supra.
71. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
72. The scope of this Comment is not intended to embrace the constitutional issues
concerning the admissibility of compulsory blood tests. The feeling here is that the
gravity of the problem which the drinking driver creates is such that any governmental system recognizing the weight of the balance between the harm to society
created by the drinking driver and the harm to personal liberties by a very small
infringement upon one's person would, without question, uphold compulsory tests.
73. 13 WAYNz L. Rev. 425, 434 (1967).
74. It is clear that the practice of the Allentown, Pennsylvania, police force of not
requiring parties accused of drunken-driving to take a blood test was not influenced by
the Schmerber decision. Only 50 percent (35 of 70) of those apprehended for drinkingdriving in Allentown in 1967 took the chemical tests for intoxication. C. Scholl, supra
note 59, at 20.
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to refuse to take the test. Implied consent laws are necessary to lend
uniformity of treatment to those charged with drunken driving.
Second, many commentators have been repelled by the "privilege"
language and the fiction of "implied consent."7 Unquestionably, there is
something dubious in couching a statute of keystone significance in indirect
terminology, because it leaves the impression that a direct statement to the
effect that refusing to submit to a blood test is a misdemeanor, and therefore punishable, would be wrong. However, such terminology is easily
borrowed from hit-and-run and nonresident motorist statutes.70 Moreover,
the language probably represents, in part, an attempt by state legislatures
to support such legislation by an already proven rationale due to a fear that
the United States Supreme Court may, in the future, find such laws unconstitutional. This is especially true since Schmerber was a 5-4 decision and
Justice Clark, a member of the Schmerber majority, has retired.
Although requiring drivers suspected of being under the influence of
alcohol to undergo chemical tests is the most important area where the
drinking-driver statutes of many American States could be improved,
it is not enough in itself. Even where such statutes are in effect, the
high alcohol level which is required to obtain a conviction allows many
obviously impaired drivers to go unpunished. A review of the impairment
studies described above 77 indicates that the .15 percent figure adopted by
most States78 is unrealistically high for determining when a driver is
impaired by alcoholic consumption.
Only one commentator has suggested that the .15 percent level is too
low.7 9 Several sources have declared that the .02 percent level is the point
where most people experience intoxication 0 and driving skills begin to
deteriorate. 8' Bjerver and Goldberg declared that .02 percent to .03 percent
was the impairment threshold for their average subject.8 2 However, the
.05 percent level is the lowest at which the average person's driving skills
are most often said to significantly deteriorate. 83 This is the level which
the British Medical Association, in a report released in 1959, established
as the highest level consistent with the safety of other drivers.8 4 Holcomb's
careful study, discussed above,8 5 found that the ratio of accident injuries
75. One source referred to such terminology as "linguistic slight of hand."
Comment, supra note 45 at 829. See also Weinstein, Statute Compelling Submission
to a Chemical Test for intoxication, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 541, 544 (1955).
76. See Comment, ConstitutionalLaw - Validity of New York Statute Setting
Out Motorists' Implied Consent to Chemical Tests for Intoxication, supra note 68,
at 1200; Comment, supra note 6, at 261.
77. See pp. 99-101 supra.
78. See p. 103 supra.
79. Hollopeter, supra note 46, at 415-17.
80. Vold, supra note 43, at 269 n.41.
81. 74 Sci. News LETTER 294 (1958).
82. Bjerver & Goldberg, supra note 25, at 25.
83. See Campbell, Courts and Prosecutors Are the Weakest Links in Preventing
Drunken Driving, 46 A.B.A.J. 43, 45 (1960); McFarland, The Epidemiology of
Motor Vehicle Accidents, 33 INS. COUNSEL J. 285, 293 (1966).
84. These findings are reported in The Drinking Driver and the Law, 1960 CRIM.
L. REv. (Eng.), 152, 153; BRIr. MED. J., Jan.-Mar., 1960, at 256.
85. See p. 99 supra.
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of drivers at the various alcohol levels to the general driving public did
not approach one-to-one until the .05 percent level, 6 indicating that the
.05 level was the minimum acceptable level. Recently, the Canadian Bar
Association suggested the adoption of a .08 percent level for that country.8 7
Finally, the Uniform Vehicle Code, which had previously adopted the
guidelines of the 1939 American Safety Council-American Medical Association conference, 8 altered its scale to make .10 percent the level at which
it is presumed that a driver is under the influence of alcohol. 89
In light of the above figures, it is obvious that the .15 percent level
adopted by most States as creating a presumption of intoxication is antiquated. The .10 percent level is at best a realistic compromise, and the .08
percent level established only by Utah appears most likely to gain the
support of the majority of advanced medical men.
Another area where the statutes of most States appear inadequate is
in meting out penalties for drunken driving. Assuming that the law, in
this area, is capable of acting as a deterrent on a large part of the driving
population, the most effective statutes for combating drinking drivers
would appear to be those which provide a strong and consistent penalty.
The Pennsylvania statute is a typical example of the failure of drinking
driver statutes in these respects. It provides for a penalty which can
range from 3 years in prison and a $500 fine at the maximum to only a
$100 fine at the minimum. Perhaps the difference was effectuated to give
judges discretion in resolving different sentences for penitent first-offenders
and recidivists, but a surer and more realistic approach would have been to
enact a definite set of penalties depending on the character of the offender.
The general shortcoming of most American statutes is that penalties
which they prescribe are, in practice, not strict enough. For example, from
the wide range of possible punishment typified by the Pennsylvania statute,
it can be anticipated that offenders usually receive a fine near the minimum.
Although some States have recently enacted statutes providing stricter
penalties, it is doubtful whether even these measures are strict enough. 90
For example, since the late 1950's California has embarked on a relatively
hard line against the drinking driver. The first conviction for this offense
is made punishable by 30 days to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of $250
to $500; the second offense results in a jail term of 5 days to 1 year and
a fine of $250 to $1000.91 If an injury occurs, imprisonment is increased
to 90 days to 5 years, even on the first offense, and, in addition, there is
86. Holcomb, supra note 15, at 1081-82.
87. Blood Alcohol and Traffic Accidents, 8
88. See p. 103 supra.

CANADIAN

B.J. 70 (1965).

89.

UNIFORM V4HICLt CODt § 11-902.
90. Of course, making the penalty too strict can result in making juries and judges
alike reluctant to convict. See Chapman, PracticalAspects of Drunken Driving Cases,

2 PORTLAND L. Rtv. 24, 25-27 (1951). For example, classifying drunken driving as
a felony, which was done under Missouri law in 1960, is certain to result in fewer
convictions. See Note, Removal of Intoxicated Drivers from Missouri Roads: A
Suggested Approach, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 84.
91. This law, CAL. VleHCLE Coot § 23102(a) (West Supp. 1967), is described
in an article by California's then-Governor in Knight, supra note 60, at 102.
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Perhaps the strictest State on

first offenders is Oklahoma, which provides a mandatory 10-day jail sentence and a fine.98 Although various other States have mandatory jail
terms for first offenders, none of these has a term over 3 days.

4

It has been suggested that a jail term of 10 to 30 days for conviction
for one's first drinking-driver offense and 90 days to 6 months for a
second such conviction be adopted in Pennsylvania. 5 That, or a similar
statutory provision, appears very reasonable. The party suggesting these
penalties felt, and it appears rightfully so, that such sanctions were not
too strict and would result in relatively consistent enforcement.
IV.

THE APPROACH OF EUROPEAN LAW

To lend perspective to the treatment of drunken driving by American
law, it is worthwhile to examine briefly the laws enacted by various
European countries in three respects: (1) the penalties imposed; (2) the
compulsory nature of chemical tests; and (3) the alcohol levels accepted
as establishing that a driver is under the influence of alcohol.
The tenor in almost all European countries is to punish strictly and
without exception. Although Russia's alleged death penalty for drinking
drivers96 and .005 alcohol level for determining whether a driver is intoxicated 97 may be exaggerations, the Communist countries of Eastern Europe
are probably the strictest on drinking drivers. One drink is sufficient
grounds to send a driver to jail in most of them, 98 and a .03 alcohol level
is in effect in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. 9
The Scandinavian countries, particularly Norway and Sweden, have
been the vanguards of strict sanctions in the western world. In 1926,
Norway established that any driver found, through compulsory tests, to
have an alcohol level in excess of .05 percent would be sentenced to a jail
term' 00 and lose his license for a year; a second offense resulted in loss of
driving privileges for life.' 0' A proposal to lower the prohibited alcohol
level to .035 percent was considered in Norway, but was rejected. 0 2 Tests
have been compulsory in Sweden since 1934,103 and the compulsory 1- to 12month prison term has rendered so many respectable Swedes inmates of one
prison that it is called "the country club."' 0 4 Another Swedish innovation
92.
93.

CAL. VICHICLZ CODE

§ 23101 (West Supp. 1967).

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11-902 (1962).

94. The Drinking Driver and the Law, supranote 84, at 159.
95. Comment, supra note 3, at 193.
96. The "Social" Drinker - An Overlooked Cause of Accidents, 6 CuRRNT
MED., Nov., 1959, at 36, 37.
97. Bongartz, supra note 50, at 89.
98. U.S. Ntws & WORLD RzP., Oct. 16, 1967, at 13.
99. Bongartz, supra note 50, at 89.
100. Campbell, Traffic Accidents Go Up Again, 22 JAG J. 61, 62 (1967).
101. The Drinking Driver and the Law, supra note 84, at 159.
102. Hansman, Driving Under the Influence, 27 AUSTL. L.J. 723, 730 (1954).
103. Slough, The Drinking Driver, 31 KAN. JUD. COUNCiL BuLL. 67 (1957).
104. TxMt, Oct. 20, 1967, at 33.
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is to impose stricter punishment for offenders found to be over the .15
percent alcohol level than for those within the level of .08 to .15 percent. 10 5
The critical alcohol levels in effect in other European countries include:
.05 percent in Yugoslavia; .08 percent in Austria; .10 percent in Denmark,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands; and .15 percent in France, Germany,
and Belgium. 10 6 Moreover, mandatory tests are employed in Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, and Switzerland. 10 7 Clearly, the European tendency is to utilize low alcohol levels at which a driver is presumed to be
intoxicated, to employ compulsory tests, and to prescribe strict penalties.
The European country whose laws are probably of most interest to
Americans are those of Great Britain. Despite a previous British
aversion to compulsory tests, 10 8 a quasi- "implied consent" law was passed
in that country on October 9, 1967, whereby refusal to take the test
resulted in an automatic $140 fine, and the accused was still subject to trial
as a drunken driver. 109 An alcohol level of greater than .08 percent results
in "almost certain" conviction. 110

However, the most striking aspect of

the new law has been its successful deterrent effect. Over the Christmas
holidays, subsequent to the passage of the new law, British traffic deaths
decreased by over 40 percent from the 1966 figures. By comparison,
American traffic deaths increased from 600 in 1966 to 684 in 1967 over
the same holiday period."' Such an increase in America is not surprising
in light of its relatively high alcohol levels required to obtain a presumption
of intoxication, its sporadic and inconsistent penalties for drinking drivers,
and the lack of unanimity among its States in requiring compulsory tests
for intoxication.
V.

THE ALCOHOLIC: A

SPECIAL KIND OF DRINKING DRIVER

The presence of the alcoholic among drinking drivers, in contrast to
the more common social drinker, has become a subject of increasing concern for medical and legal scholars. The first study concerned with
establishing that alcoholics were greatly overrepresented among drinking drivers and comprised a significant portion of them was rather
unsuccessful in proving its hypotheses. The party conducting the research found that in his sample of 430 drivers involved in accidents in York County (Toronto area), Canada, only 2.6 percent of
105. Ryan, supra note 31, at 56.
106. These figures are obtained from two sources: (1) An excellent chart in
Breitnecker, Alcohol Testing Programs in Europe, Breath Alcohol Tests - Sym-

posium, 5

TRIAL LAWYERS'

Gumn

84, 92 (1961); and (2) Little, Control of the

Drinking Driver: Science Challenges Legal Creativity, 54 A.B.A.J. 555, 556 (1968).
107. Breitnecker, supra note 106, at 92.
108. See, e.g., Hails, The Drinking Driver Analysed - (I), 115 L.J. (Eng.) 329,
330 (1965).
109. U.S. Nnws & WORLD REP., Oct. 16, 1967, at 13.
110. TIME, Oct. 20, 1967, at 33.
111. U.S. N~ws & WORLD RAP., Jan. 8, 1968, at 9. See also Bongartz, s'upra
note 50, at 92.
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the sample were alcoholics." 2 Recent studies, however, have been much
more successful in establishing these hypotheses. Findings that 45 percent
of the drinking drivers apprehended in Sweden were known alcoholics," l3
and that 40 percent of the fatally injured drivers in the Ann Arbor, Michigan area from 1961 to 1964 were alcoholics," 4 certainly do seem to indicate
that the alcoholic is greatly overrepresented in the group of drinking drivers.
The most impressive study was that of Waller, working in Oakland,
California. He studied four separate groups: (1) drivers arrested for
drunken driving who were not in accidents; (2) drivers in accidents (a)
who were charged with drunken driving, and (b) who were not so charged;
(3) drivers convicted of moving violations other than drunken driving;
and (4) drivers who were not convicted of any violations at all."' Of
the parties falling into groups (1) and (2) (a), 87 percent and 76 percent,
respectively, were found to have been known by police or social agencies
to have a "drinking problem." 1" 6 The other groups, (2) (b), (3), and (4),
showed that 39 percent, 34 percent, and 19 percent of their constituents,
respectively, had a "drinking problem."" 7 Hence, parties with a so-called
"drinking problem" made up a very high percentage of those arrested for
drunken driving and they were clearly overrepresented in the groups including those arrested for that offense.
Another study, taking a different point of departure, found that the
98 patients at a Canadian hospital for the rehabilitation of alcoholics, after
adjustments were made for mileage driven with that of the average driver,
had significantly more arrests and license suspensions than the general
driving population." 8 The alcoholic is said to account for two-and-one-half
times the accidents, six times the license suspensions, and nine times the
drunken driving convictions as would normally be expected from his
number in the general population." 9
Although the above studies certainly indicate that the alcoholic driver
is a serious problem, their results do not justify the implication frequently
made by their authors that the severity of the problem of the social-drinking
driver has been overemphasized because alcoholics are really the causative
factor of most of the injuries and accidents resulting from drinking
112. Popham, Alcoholism and Traffic Accidents, 17 Q.J.

STUD. ON ALCOHOL

225,

227 (1956). Although Popham concluded that these findings showed that a "significantly high proportion" of drinking drivers were alcoholics, his disappointment in his
results was shown by his attempts to invoke confounding variables, which may have
rendered his results too low. Id. at 229-30.
113. Seizer, Automobile Accidents and the Alcoholic Personality: An Unrecognized Dilemma, MICH. ST. B.J., Nov., 1960, at 12, 15.
114. Selzer & Weiss, Alcoholism and Traffic Fatalities: Study in Futility, 122
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 762, 763 (1966).
115. Waller, supra note 55, at 114-16 (1967).
116. Id. at 117. In defining "drinking problem," Waller used the World Health
Organization definition, i.e., the party's drinking was of such an extent that it affected
his health, socioeconomic functioning, or both. Id. at 116.
117. Id. at 117.
118. Schmidt & Smart, Alcoholism, Drinking and Traffic Accidents, 20 Q.J. STUD.
ON ALCOHOL 631, 639, 640 (1959).
119. ScI. DiG., Aug., 1961, at 20. See also Schmidt & Smart, A Note on Alcoholics
and Drunk Driving, 1 CarM. L.Q. 419 (1959).
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drivers.120 There are several confounding variables clearly operating upon
the results of these studies. First the definition of "alcoholic" is uncertain.
It is not a scientific term, and no objective measures for determining
whether a specific party is an alcoholic have been offered. Second, the
more successful studies, such as that of Waller, are dealing with subjects
differentiated only by whether they have been arrested for drunken driving. With relatively high alcohol levels required to convict in the United
States and many prosecutors willing to compromise prosecutions for
drunken driving unless the defendant is a recidivist or has caused damages
or injuries, these studies may be differentiating only drivers who have
drunk very heavily prior to the time at which they are apprehended or
who are constant recidivists from the general driving population. Finally,
although the high percentage of alcoholics involved in accidents and
drinking-driver convictions may partially explain away the studies finding
a high percentage of drinking drivers among parties involved in or killed
in accidents, it does not affect the validity of the impairment studies, which
show that any driver will be affected by having consumed a certain amount
of alcohol.
Although the studies on alcoholics may be correct in concluding that
the law is unable to deal with alcoholics and probably requires such preventive measures as compulsory treatment for them,'12 1 it is a mistake to
assume that the effective control of the alcoholic will solve the problem of
the drinking driver. The primary emphasis of any program to combat the
problem of the drinking driver must be directed at the social drinker.

VI.

IMPROVING THE ENFORCEMENT OF AMERICAN LAW

It has been pointed out that American laws to combat the drinking
driver, on the whole, need substantial improvement; however, such improvement will be meaningless if the laws cannot be enforced. To a great
extent, improving the law and improving its enforcement go hand-in-hand,
since the weaknesses in the laws surely do not facilitate the conviction
rates. However, a law is ultimately only as effective as the consensus of
its support. There are several special problems of enforcement inherent
in drinking-driver cases.
Presenting the results of a chemical test into evidence in a drinkingdriver case, even though these results are uniformally admissible, is a
complicated matter. Any weak link in the chain of custody of a test sample
may be fatal to the prosecutor's case.' 22 The availability of expert testimony - or at least well-educated policemen - is necessary to explain

120. See Little, supra note 106, at 557; Selzer, supra note 113, at 15.
121. See Little, supra note 106, at 559; Selzer, supra note 113, at 61-62; Waller,
supra note 55, at 119-20.
122. See Gorov & Chapman, Use of Blood Tests to Establish Intoxication, 8 TRIAL
LAWY4RS' GUIDE 141, 142 (1964), which cites 10 different hands through which a
chain of custody of a blood sample must generally be established.
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in detail the chemical reactions involved in the test.123 An intelligent defense
attorney can flood the prosecution's witnesses with questions and thereby
frequently cast doubt on the accuracy of the tests and on the observation
testimony of witnesses. 12
However, this is only a small part of the difficulty in securing convictions in drinking-driver cases. The more subjective difficulties arise from
the sympathy with which juries, judges, and even prosecutors seem to view
the drinking driver. Although this sympathy might be understandable if
the consequences of conviction were as severe as in Europe, such an
attitude in America is indeed frustrating in light of its relatively
lenient penalties. Drinking-driver cases are those least popular with prosecutors. 1 25 To avoid proceeding with such cases, prosecutors frequently

nolpros them or allow them to go stale, 126 particularly if they know the
defendant. 2 7 If the case is prosecuted, the charge is often lowered to reckless
driving or some other lesser offense.' 28 One source attributes much of the
difficulty in attaining convictions to the bench's softness and corruption. 129
Most sources feel, however, that juries are the weakest link in obtaining a record of steady convictions of drinking drivers. Jury members,
recalling occasions when they were fortunate to avoid apprehension for
131
130
and thus tend to identify
drunk driving, feel threatened by the police
and sympathize with such defendants. For example, an English study
indicated that, while magistrates convicted 91 percent of all drunken drivers
brought before them, juries convicted only 48 percent. 132 If judges do
become stricter, defendants will frequently seek more time-consuming and,
from their point of view, more successful jury trials. 18
Since prosecutors, judges, and juries are not only the primary constituents of the American legal system, but are also members of the public,
their sympathy with drunken drivers and their reluctance to convict are
indicative of a general public unawareness - or apathy - regarding the
danger of the drinking driver. Public apathy was cited as the primary
123. See id. at 143-73, for a detailed account of the lengthy testimony of a toxicologist and his chemist at a recent trial.
124. See Erwin, Defense of Persons Accused of Driving While Under the
Influence, PRAc. LAW., Jan., 1965, at 73; Hollopeter, supra note 46, at 412-18. The
venerable Dr. Heise expresses his disgust with such tactics very dramatically in Heise,
Chemical Tests for Intoxication - Scientific Background and Public Acceptance, 41
MARQ. L. Rtv. 296, 297-98 (1958).
125. Chapman, supra note 90, at 24-27.
126. Watts, supra note 42, at 39.
127. Chapman, supra note 90, at 26. See also Crash Echoes Across the Nation,
Lnvr, July 19, 1963, at 22.
128. Chapman, supra note 90, at 25.
129. Knight, supra note 60, at 100, 102.
130. Brooks, supra note 48, at 10.
131. Chapman, supra note 90, at 26.
132. The Drinking Driver and the Law, supra note 84, at 156.
133. Chapman, supra note 90, at 27. The attempt to secure a sympathetic jury is
described as being an important part of the defense attorney's case in Hollopeter,
supra note 46, at 408-09. Defense attorneys are thus urged to shun "prohibitionistic"
juries: "If the jury, as finally selected, includes a goodly number who would say of
the defendant, 'There go I but for the grace of God,' you are well under way to the
trial of the case before an open-minded jury." Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
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problem in convicting drinking drivers in articles written several years
ago, 18 4 and it seems to be just as viable a causative factor today. That such
apathy still exists is exemplified by the reactions of two members of the
bar to the increased severity in the penalties under the California drinkingdriver statute. A California attorney, after reciting the "extreme hardship" of receiving a conviction in his State, produced a virtual manual
for discovering loopholes in the prosecution's case, 8 5 apparently oblivious
to the danger usually created by such defendants. However, perhaps most
disappointing was the following quotation from an article by the Deputy
District Attorney of Marin County, California: "The violation [drunk
driving] is properly characterized as a petty offense; nonetheless, the consequences of a conviction can be severe."'8 6 If this is indicative of the
attitude of those who are the public representatives in prosecuting drinking
drivers, it is hardly surprising that enforcement of the law in this area
has been so lax.
The basis of the problem, then, both from a social and a legal viewpoint, appears to be public apathy. Public propaganda has been the principal method utilized heretofore to combat such apathy. This method has
been effectuated by advertising slogans of the "drinking-and-driving-don'tmix" variety. Although impatience with the effectiveness of these slogans
is prevalent, 37 there is practically no way to measure just how many more
drinking drivers might be on the roads were it not for such exhortations.
Surely, such slogans can do little but help.
A related approach that has been suggested is the institution of a
general education program. 138 A systematic educational program directed
at high school students, which would include furthering an attitude which
upgrades the status of a driver's license and making testing standards and
qualifications higher, has also been suggested. 1 9 Perhaps the most effective
education would be the appearance of more articles in national magazines
like that of Roalman in the March 1968 issue of Today's Health. 40 Such
an article, which realistically describes the dangers of combining drinking
with driving, explains the current laws, and most importantly, the number
of drinks which one must consume in order to approach a dangerous
134. See Seliger, supra note 13, at 404; Comment, supra note 3, at 165, which cites
"lack of public consciousness" first among the five problems which make the apprehension of the drinking driver difficult.
135. Erwin, supra note 124. See also Hollopeter, supra note 46. The latter article
does, however, appear to recognize the menace of the drinking driver, but maintains,
rightly, that he must be defended at least as well as a felon. Id. at 418.
136. Roth, Drunk Driving: Selected Problems of Procedural Due Process, 14
HASTINGs L.J. 399 (1963) (emphasis added).
137. See Knight, supra note 60, at 101. Several of the medical men concerned with
the alcoholic, in their inability to discern how such slogans can affect the alcoholic,
are especially critical of the efficacy of this approach. See Schmidt & Smart, supra
note 118, at 641 ; Selzer, supra note 113, at 15. One source did, however, urge more
extensive use of propaganda. Freeman, supra note 63, at 1636.
138. Monroe, supra note 3, at 405.
139. 79 Sci. Ngws LETTER 338 (1961).
140. Roalman, supra note 4. See also Bongartz, supra note 50. However, the
former, unlike the latter, never alters its tone of addressing and educating the average
person without appealing to the reader on other, more sensational grounds.
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alcohol level, is easily read and has the advantage of widespread circulation.
Perhaps a systematic dissemination of such articles would be the most
effective means of effectuating the educational approach.
The efficacy of such approaches on alcoholics may, of course, be limited.
However, slogans and education probably dissuade alcoholics from driving
to some extent and might encourage their friends and relatives to take
steps to keep them off the road.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most effective means of dealing with the problem of the
di inking driver would be to reshape the structure of our society to remove,
in part, the great American dependence on the automobile. Henry Ford,
in 1927, foresaw the dire effects of removing prohibition in the wake of
the mushrooming increase in auto ownership which had taken place since
prohibition's inception. 141 There is no question that the taverns and bars
which dot American highways can frequently be reached - and returned
from - only by automobile.' 4 2 The presence of the alcoholic on our highways is not surprising, since the auto is essential to him as well. Moreover, the fact that a driver's license has become so essential in our society
has furthered the reluctance of juries to convict drunken drivers, when
suspension of one's license often accompanies such convictions. 143 Of course,
removing our society's dependence on the auto is chiefly a problem of landuse planning, but the effect of that problem on the seemingly ubiquitous presence of the drinking driver on American highways should not be forgotten.
The very minimum which the legal fabric can accomplish is the improvement of the statutes prohibiting driving while intoxicated. The adoption of
implied consent laws or their equivalent is an absolute necessity to the institution of effective law enforcement. Reducing the alcohol level above which
a driver is presumed to be intoxicated and providing stricter, more consistent penalties are also necessary for more appropriate statutes. Although
it has been suggested that only by preventing people from driving for a
certain number of hours after drinking any liquor at all can drinking-driver
laws be made uniformly effective and fair, 44 this is simply not practical or
possibly enforceable in an America which has lost its "prohibitionistic
flavor.' 1 45 A somewhat more practical suggestion for facilitating enforcement of drinking-driver statutes is that police institute periodic road blocks
to more readily ferret out drinking drivers, 146 or at least to frighten the
141. Borkenstein, The Evolution of Modern Instruments for Breath Alcohol
Analysis, Breath Alcohol Tests - Symposium, TRIAL LAWYtRS' GUIDE, Feb., 1961,
at 109.
142. Selzer, supra note 113, at 16.

143. Watts, supra note 42, at 38.
144. It can be inferred that this is the only solution which would be approved by
a Baptist minister who originated the "Voice of Temperance." Morris, Liquor and
Highway Slaughter, AM. MERCURY, Nov., 1959, at 143, 145. Such a suggestion was
also directly offered by a medical man. Rabinowitch, supra note 2, at 248.
145. Roalman, supra note 4, at 34.
146. Chapman, supra note 90, at 28-29.
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public into sobriety by the possibility of confronting such a road block.
Stake-outs at bars might also prove an effective means of enforcement.
The laws in this area can, however, be ultimately successful only by
instituting a program to remove the public apathy to the severity of the
problem. Despite the various propaganda and educational programs which
have already been instituted, very few Americans are aware of the severity
of the danger created by the drinking driver's presence on the road. A
random survey showed that 42 percent of the driving population who drink
admitted that they regularly drive after drinking, and an additional 20
147
percent admitted to occasionaly doing so.

The only effective means of significantly eliminating the presence of
the drinking driver is to impress upon the public that driving after one has
consumed more than a token amount of alcohol is unthinkable. The problem that it is frequently very inconvenient not to drive after drinking must
be solved, either by reducing the dependence on the auto, providing ready
and inexpensive taxi service to people under the influence, or, and it bears
repeating, simply making the two activities so unthinkable that convenience
will be a secondary consideration of the drinker who is about to drive.
David A. Scholl
147. Selzer, supra note 113, at 16.
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